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After a hiatus of more than 30 years, smallpox and smallpox vac-
cine issues have emerged in the scienti¢c and political landscapes.
After the eradication of smallpox in 1977 and the gradual decrease
in use of smallpox vaccine in the years thereafter, the only per-
sons who contacted vaccinia virus were those working in labora-
tories in which the virus was used as a potential vector or as an
object of basic science investigation. In this issue of the Journal,
Mempel and colleagues report an instance of laboratory acquired
vaccinia infection in a worker in just such a laboratory (Mempel
et al, 2003). This is not the ¢rst instance of a laboratory acquired
infection (Openshaw et al, 1991). In addition, one instance of con-
tact vaccinia occurred in an individual from a dog bite while she
removed a vaccinia-laden sachet (designed to immunize wild
animals against rabies) from his mouth (Rupprecht et al, 2001).
These are isolated, rare events in the era between cessation of vac-
cination and today’s revival of activity with vaccinia.We can ex-
pect that contact with vaccinia in the laboratory and in the ¢eld
will increase exponentially as the United States and other coun-
tries resume vaccinations and study of the virus in the laboratory.
In the instance reported here, the lab worker examination
revealed ‘‘Only the palms of both hands showed signs of mild
skin barrier disturbance, e.g., small erosions from working with
unprotected hands in cold temperature over a prolonged period.’’
In the rabies bait incident the woman infected had epidermolytic
hyperkeratosis. One can assume with reasonable assurance that
both persons, and others who experience this type of contact vac-
cinia, had disrupted skin that permitted vaccinia virus to infect
(Ne¡ et al, 2002). Patients with atopic dermatitis, Darier’s disease,
and other disruptive skin diseases are vulnerable to contact inocu-
lation vaccinia. (Ne¡ et al, 2002; CDC, n.d.) In the report pub-
lished in this issue of the JID, the authors suggest that the
immunodulating construct, inserted into vaccinia virus, may have
been responsible for the ‘take’ in the lab worker. That is not ne-
cessarily true, as the virus is capable of infecting without assis-
tance from the construct that suppresses adhesion of human
peripheral lymphocytes to ICAM-1. The fact that the lesions
healed without speci¢c treatment indicates that lymphocytes
were active, did get to the site, and did control the virus infec-
tion. Had they not done so, one would have expected progressive
vaccinia lesions. (Fulginiti et al, 1968).
The lab worker in this instance was not vaccinated, despite
guidelines suggesting that all such workers be vaccinated before
handling Orthopox viruses (CDC, 2001). Others have argued
against vaccination of lab workers (Wenzel and Nettleman,
1989). I believe the rationale raised in the latter letter to Lancet
used spurious arguments (i.e., the recombinants are attenuated,
the chances for accident are minimal, and if the workers had con-
tact with susceptible patients they might transmit the virus).
There will be accidents; I have been consulted on an instance
of vaccinia virus splashed onto the face of an experienced lab
worker, despite the availability of hoods. The recombinants can
produce lesions, as shown in this report, and have been used as
e⁄cient vaccinating antigens (Cooney et al, 1991). Safeguards can
be provided against spread from vaccination sites (CDC, 2002).
The authors of the current report explain that the recommen-
dations largely originate from the US, and that vaccine is not
generally available. Yet, workers at the CDC and at other labora-
tories have been routinely vaccinated, and given the small num-
ber of laboratories worldwide that deal with Orthopox viruses,
one would have thought some accommodation could be made
to supply each of these labs with vaccine from available stock-
piles. If that is not the case, then it should be in the future. The
best protection against spread of vaccinia virus in the laboratory is
to have a fully immunized sta¡. Even then, inoculation vaccinia
could occur with an injury or disease su⁄cient to place the virus
in direct contact with disrupted skin, although one would expect
a more accelerated reaction, given the level of immunity, and no
spread from the primary site of inoculation.
In short, all workers with Orthopox viruses should be vacci-
nated before they contact the virus in the laboratory. Those with
dermatologic lesions that might predispose them to contact vac-
cinia should either refrain from such lab work if possible, or if
not, use precautions such as rubber gloves and other protective
gear and other measures suggested by the ACIP (CDC, 2002).
Useful counselling has been provided by Williams and Cooper
as well (1993).
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